The LuLac Edition #5, 620, April 5th, 2026

 

TRUMP’S

LIBERATION

DAY

ONE YEAR LATER

 

My, my, my, how time flies. It was one year ago that Donald Trump introduced his tariffs which he said would generate more money “than you’ve ever seen before” for American consumers. That hasn’t happened.  As a matter of fact, prices on food and other things has gone up instead of down. Now I’m no expert except to say that the clothing I buy from Paul Frederick has gone up 15%, my Diet Coke when not on sale went up $5 for a 24 pack, the 8 ounce 10 pack cans of Coke Classic went from $3.50 to !0.00 bucks a case or on sale at 2 for $14.00, Candy up $10% to 15%,  gas up $1.15 a gallon that equates to $16.00 bucks more and bagels up by 40 cents per.

That stated, here’s something from an expert that explains it all about Liberation Day one year ago.

On April 2, 2025, Trump celebrated his self-proclaimed “Liberation Day” by raising tariffs on nearly every U.S. trading partner to historic highs not seen since 1909. That action brought the average effective tariff rate to 22.5 percent and sent markets tumbling. Just seven days later, he reversed course, pausing the bulk of those tariffs for ninety days, leaving a 10 percent across-the-board tax on imports—while raising tariffs on China to a whopping 125 percent. 

Trump explained this change of heart as entirely intentional, prompted by “more than 75 Countries” reaching out “to negotiate a solution.” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent further ramped up the spin, saying “President Trump created maximum negotiating leverage for himself” by issuing such a massive tariff threat, and White House advisor Peter Navarro declared that it would be possible to reach “ninety deals in ninety days.” But at the ninety-day mark, just two deals were completed. This was despite the fact that Trump still had plenty of leverage, as the remaining tariffs sat at a high of 18.5 percent—levels not seen since 1933. 

In the months that followed, the administration issued a multitude of new threats, though these were not always successful. The big deals—with Brazil, China, India—remained elusive. One year later, just seventeen deals have been concluded. Importantly, all of those deals were hammered out before the Supreme Court ruled in February that Trump’s emergency tariffs were unconstitutional. With the future of the tariff regime in limbo, some countries got cold feet about finalizing a deal. India canceled a planned trip to Washington. Implementation of the European Union’s deal was fraught and delayed. Some of the urgency to negotiate has therefore been reduced as the administration works to rebuild its tariff wall, whose final form will undoubtedly reshape all of the deals negotiated to date. 

Stepping back from the twists and turns of the negotiating drama that has unfolded since Liberation Day, it is clear that despite the bold pronouncements, little has been achieved.

A detailed look at the content of every deal also reveals that they are not at all like trade deals of the past. Three elements stand out. 

First, the deals are asymmetrical, not reciprocal. They require U.S. trading partners to make new commitments while the United States retains higher barriers than were in place prior to Trump taking office. This means that overall U.S. protectionism is still high. 

Second, the deals take two forms: frameworks and agreements. The frameworks are loosely constructed promises to negotiate a more complete agreement in the future. They essentially serve to freeze tariffs at a certain rate and lay the groundwork for more negotiations. The agreements are pared back trade deals that include commitments beyond tariffs, such as removing regulatory barriers, coordinating “economic security” concerns, and agreeing to invest in the United States and purchase U.S. products. It remains to be seen whether all of those commitments can be met. This is especially true for the deals with developing countries, such as Cambodia and Vietnam. Unlike trade deals in the past, where the United States would provide technical assistance to developing countries to meet their obligations, today’s deals provide no such support. 

Third, and most consequentially for the future trajectory of U.S. trade policy, Trump’s approach to trade agreements has been entirely led by the executive branch. Historically, trade deals have been congressional-executive agreements because the Constitution gives Congress primary authority over trade policy. In a typical trade negotiation, Congress is consulted from start to finish, sets objectives for the executive branch, and ratifies the final text of an agreement. None of Trump’s trade deals have involved Congress. So not only has Congress had no role in ensuring the trade deals represent the interests of various constituencies, but the deals also lack the assurance that what is negotiated will be honored by the United States. Without congressional ratification, Trump can change the deals at a whim. 

Taking all of these factors into account paints a clearer picture of Trump’s trade strategy since Liberation Day, which can be described as  rushed and improvisational. The texts will likely continue to evolve and change as Trump desires. While early deals were scant on details, they became more complex over time. However, nearly every deal is a replica of a previous version, with small modifications. It is no surprise that trading partners have been confused. Furthermore, the lack of a cohesive vision and the sidelining of Congress in the negotiation process makes these deals not U.S. trade agreements, but rather Trump’s trade deals. With all the uncertainty that surrounds them, they may last just as long as his presidency. 

Yep, Liberation Day. The only thing that got liberated was more of our money.

Inu Manak is a senior fellow for international trade at CFR.  (LuLac, Council on Foreign Relations)